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pro-competitive effects, must be applied.'
-E.A.
BROWN V. PRO FOOTBALL, INC., No. 90-1071 (RCL) U.S. DIST.
LEXIS 18094 (D.D.C. SEPT. 10, 1992).
Professional football players who played on Developmental
Squads for the National Football League (NFL) teams during the
1989 season brought a class action against the 28 individual NFL
teams and the NFL itself.
The use of Developmental Squads was a new concept which
permitted NFL teams to sign rookie and first-year free agents to
personal services contracts for the season. The NFL Constitution
was amended to include Resolution G-2, provided that certain
players placed on reserve/injured status could not practice and
that others could, but would count against each Club's limit of six
Developmental Squad players (maximum of 47 players per team).
Those players on Developmental Squads were to be treated equally
with players on the Reserve/Injured list and players on the Inac-
tive list. Under the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, players on the
Reserve/Injured list are compensated at the full rate of their NFL
Players Contracts. Under Resolution G-2, Developmental Squad
players would be paid a fixed salary of $1,000 per week instead of
being permitted to negotiate their own salaries. Plaintiffs filed suit.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
uniform wage provision of Resolution G-2 violates the Sherman
Antitrust Act, and that under the Clayton Act, they are entitled to
damages and attorney's fees. The NFL teams claimed that the an-
titrust laws do not apply to "wage-fixing restraints" imposed by
employer groups on employees. The U.S. District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that wage-fixing is an antitrust violation to
which the Sherman Act applies. The court determined that the
wage restraints, under these circumstances, were not subject to the
per se rule whereby there is no defense to the antitrust violation.
Rather, the court held that the "Rule of Reason" test applied, thus
permitting the NFL teams to defend the passage of the wage-re-
straint. Under this test, the court must balance the anti-competi-
tive effects of the challenged restraint against its pro-competitive
effects. If anti-competitive effects outweigh pro-competitive effects,
the restraint is found to be unreasonable and violative of antitrust
1. Editor's note: A summary of the final outcome of the McNeil case will appear in
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laws. The court concluded that the NFL's alleged pro-competitive
purposes were either insufficient as a matter of law or irrelevant to
the rule of reason analysis. As such, the court granted plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment.
-E.A.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AsSOCIATION V: MILLER, 795 F.
Supp. 1476 (D.NEv. 1992).
On April 8, 1991, the Nevada Legislature enacted Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§398.155 - 398.255, which imposed numerous new procedural
due process restrictions on NCAA infractions investigations of Ne-
vada NCAA member institutions. The statutes, in part, required
the NCAA to provide the defendant institution with all documents
to be used at the prehearing conference at least 30 days in advance
of the conference, allowed defendants to confront witnesses, re-
quired the NCAA to give copies of all exculpatory statements they
obtained to the defendant, demanded an impartial committee be
created to rule on violations and sanctions, and required all NCAA
hearings be open to the public as well as recorded and transcribed.
These requirements substantially altered the NCAA's standing
rules regarding investigation and hearing procedure. During the
summer of 1991 several of the defendants, at the time employees
of University of Nevada - Las Vegas, demanded that the NCAA
conform to the Nevada statutes' requirements in relation to an in-
fractions investigation that had started in December 1990. The
NCAA then filed an action for declaratory relief, claiming the Ne-
vada statutes violated both the Commerce Clause and the Con-
tracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and seeking injunctive relief
to enjoin the application of the statutes to the NCAA's ongoing
investigation of UNLV.
The District Court for Nevada ruled in favor of the NCAA on
three major issues. First, the defendants' claim that the court
should abstain from considering the federal constitutional claims
and allow the case to be heard in Nevada state court was denied
because the court found that no sensitive social policy issues were
presented and felt that no state judicial pronouncement could dis-
pel the federal questions raised by the NCAA. The court then
ruled that the Nevada statutes violated the Commerce Clause.
Finding the NCAA's activities, being of such national scope, suffi-
cient to allow Commerce Clause analysis, the court ruled that
while the statutes were not per se invalid, their effect restricts the
NCAA's ability to promulgate and enforce uniform rules without
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